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IRAQ:	Saddam Increasingly Pressed, Considering Options		
	Diplomatic setbacks, economic decline, and the ascendancy of hardliners are putting pressure on Saddam and increasing the likelihood that he will become more confrontational.		
	— A recent string of diplomatic failures has dashed Iraqi expectations of a breakthrough at the UN by this month. The UN Special Commission on Iraq last month noted Baghdad's failure to account for growth medium for biological weapons and effectively blocked Iraq's supporters in the Security Council from submitting a resolution to lift the oil embargo.		
	— The UN is also pressing Iraq to account for chemical weapons precursors that it previously tried to explain away. Baghdad's rejection last month of UN Resolution 986, the latest oil-for-food sales plan, bolstered Washington's position		
	continued		


30 May 1995

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The war





CIA CPAS


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Tuesday, 30 May 1995







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## Saddam Not Likely To Concede on Key Issues Soon

Baghdad appears determined to comply only to disclose its past biological and chemical	
officials continue to claim publicly that the material was used for medical research in Induring the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in 19	raqi hospitals or was destroyed
<ul> <li>Iraqi foot-dragging on other issues, missing Kuwaitis and the return of will further delay the lifting of the</li> </ul>	captured Kuwaiti equipment,
Hardliners Push for Confrontation	
Setbacks at the UN led Saddam to send har instead of Aziz to the sanctions review this r	
— Even if Aziz retains his leading pos he will be opposed by hardliners, le have Saddam's ear and appear to ha Resolution 986. Recent editorials in called for an end to diplomacy and demands. Similar <i>Babil</i> articles in presaged shifts by Baghdad toward	ed by Saddam's son Uday, who have orchestrated the rejection of an Uday's newspaper Babil have the "vicious circle" of UN March and October 1994
— Despite public assurances that Bag cooperate with the UN to settle the accused Ekeus of helping the CIA f against Iraq. According to UN offic cooperate—at least until Ekeus's a arrived in Baghdad on Thursday to machines. (S NF) -CIA, DIA, NSA-	se issues, Babil last week Fabricate incriminating evidence cials, Iraq was refusing to rrival—with a UN team that destroy dual-use manufacturing
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